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1. INTRODUCTION 
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 (“VRA”)1 is often heralded as 
one the most effective pieces of social legislation enacted by 
Congress.2  Originally signed into law in 1965 at the height of the 
 
* Executive Editor, University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law.  J.D. 
Candidate, 2010, University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.A., 2005, University of 
Rochester.  The Author would like to thank Wade Henderson, Julie Fernandes, 
and Debo Adegbile for their mentorship, as well as the editorial staff of the Journal 
of International Law for their hard work.  Above all, the Author is grateful to his 
parents for their guidance and inspiration. 
1 Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 
1971, 1973 to 1973bb-1 (2006)). 
2 See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 927–28 (1995) (commenting that the 
VRA “has been of vital importance in eradicating invidious discrimination from 
the electoral process and enhancing the legitimacy of our political institutions”); 
Hugh Davis Graham, Voting Rights and the American Regulatory State, in 
CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING 177, 177 (Bernard Grofman & Chandler 
Davidson eds., 1992) (noting that the Voting Rights Act is “one of the most 
effective instruments of social legislation in the modern era of American reform”); 
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Civil Rights Movement, the VRA outlaws racial discrimination in 
voting, and has played a major role in reshaping American 
democracy.  After nearly 100 years of Jim Crow, the VRA helped 
“shift the advantage of time and inertia from the perpetrators of 
evil to its victims,”3 adding teeth to the Fifteenth Amendment’s 
promise that the right to vote “shall not be denied or abridged by 
the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or 
previous condition of servitude.”4  Today, after more than 40 years 
of implementation, the VRA has contributed to substantial 
increases in the rates of minority voter participation and electoral 
success.5  In 2006, Congress reauthorized core provisions of the 
VRA for twenty-five years, finding that—despite incredible 
gains—discrimination in voting remains a significant roadblock to 
full minority political participation.6 
In so doing, Congress reaffirmed a strong expression of federal 
legislative power, allowing the federal government to insert itself 
into state and local elections in order to thwart racial 
discrimination in voting.  Nevertheless, the continuing vitality of 
the federal government’s power to confront racial discrimination in 
voting through the VRA is uncertain.  The Supreme Court has 
shown a willingness to limit the reach of the VRA and, more 
generally, Congress’s power to remedy racial discrimination 
perpetrated by state and local governments.  For example, in a 
series of cases in the 1990s, the Court used the Equal Protection 
Clause to strike down redistricting plans in which state and local 
governments used race as a factor in reapportionment in order to 
 
George W. Bush, Statement on Legislation to Reauthorize the Voting Rights Act, 
42 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOCS. 1371 (July 20, 2006) (describing the Voting Rights 
Act as “one of the most important pieces of legislation in our Nation’s history”).  
3 South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 328 (1966). 
4 U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1. 
5 NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT, PROTECTING MINORITY 
VOTERS: THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT AT WORK 1982–2005, at 36–49 (Feb. 2006), available 
at http://www.lawyerscommittee.org/admin/voting_rights/documents/files/0 
023.pdf (noting statistically that there have been vast increases in minority voting 
participation and the number of minority elected officials since passage of the 
VRA). 
6 See Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, & Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act 
Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109–246, §§ 2, 4–5, 120 
Stat. 577 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1973b-1973c (West 2003 & Supp. 
2007)) (“[V]estiges of discrimination in voting continue to exist as demonstrated 
by second generation barriers constructed to prevent minority voters from fully 
participating in the electoral process.”). 
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comply with the VRA and help minorities elect candidates of their 
choice.7 
Most recently, in Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District No. 
One (NAMUDNO) v. Holder, decided in 2009, the Supreme Court 
cast doubt on the constitutionality of the VRA’s “preclearance” 
component, which requires all or part of sixteen states with 
particularly egregious histories of racial discrimination to acquire 
“preclearance” from the federal government before administering 
any changes in election or voting law.8  Preclearance, established 
by Section 49 and Section 510 of the VRA, is regarded as the heart of 
the VRA’s protections.11  Although ultimately passing on the 
constitutionality of preclearance and, instead, ruling narrowly on 
statutory grounds, Chief Justice Roberts’s majority opinion in 
NAMUDNO mused considerably over the constitutionality of 
Congress’s decision in 2006 to reauthorize preclearance for twenty-
five years.12  The opinion questioned whether sufficient evidence of 
racial discrimination by state and local governments justified 
Congress’s decision to reauthorize preclearance, expressing 
 
7 See Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996) (holding, inter alia, that compliance 
with Section 5 of the VRA is not a sufficiently compelling governmental interest to 
justify the use of race in districting); Miller, 515 U.S. at 917–20 (1995) (holding that 
strict scrutiny will be applied to analyzing the constitutionality of apportionment 
if voting districts are bizarrely shaped and it is proven that race was a 
“predominant” factor in drawing district lines); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993) 
(holding that the use of race in drawing election districts is permissible only if the 
government can show that it is necessary to achieve a compelling governmental 
interest). 
8 Northwest Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504 (2009) 
[hereinafter NAMUDNO]. 
9 42 U.S.C. § 1973a(b) (2006). 
10 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (2006). 
11 Drew S. Days III, Section 5 and the Role of the Justice Department, in 
CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING, supra note 2, at 52–53. 
12 NAMUDNO, 129 S. Ct. at 2511–13.  In the Court’s slip opinion, the majority 
opinion comprises just over 16 pages.  Three and a half of those pages discuss 
“serious constitutional questions” that the VRA presents, and an additional two 
pages discuss why the Court avoided resolution of such constitutional questions.  
Id.  See also Jeffrey Rosen, Roberts versus Roberts: Just How Radical Is the Chief 
Justice?, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 11, 2010, at 17–18, available at 
http://www.tnr.com/article/politics/roberts-versus-roberts?page=0,1 (noting 
that the Court was originally set on “issuing a sweeping 5-4 decision, striking 
down the Voting Rights Act on constitutional grounds” but—whether for 
strategic or other reasons—eventually backed off and issued a narrower decision 
on statutory grounds). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
1152 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 31:4 
 
concern that preclearance may violate “our historic tradition that 
all the States enjoy ‘equal sovereignty.’”13 
Some commentators have read the opinion as “unambiguously 
serv[ing] notice that the Justices are prepared to invalidate the 
[preclearance regime].”14  Indeed, coupled with decisions issued 
earlier in the 2000s in which the Court chose to read narrowly core 
provisions of the text of the VRA,15 the Court has unmistakably 
charted a course toward limiting congressional power to combat 
state and local racial discrimination in voting. 
The VRA is a critical component of civil rights enforcement in 
the United States and has been the subject of several Supreme 
Court cases.  As a result, a flurry of scholarship has emerged 
regarding the VRA.16  Absent from such scholarship has been any 
 
13 NAMUDNO, 129 S. Ct. at 2512.  See also id. (“The statute’s coverage formula 
is based on data that is now more than 35 years old, and there is considerable 
evidence that it fails to account for current political conditions.”). 
14 Posting of Tom Goldstein to SCOTUSblog, Analysis: Supreme Court 
Invalidates Section 5’s Coverage Scheme, http://www.scotusblog.com/2009/06 
/analysis-supreme-court-invalidates-section-5%E2%80%99s-coverage-scheme-2 
(June 22, 2009, 13:13 EST).  See also Voting Rights Act—Preclearance: Northwest 
Austin Municipal Utility District No. One v. Holder, 123 HARV. L. REV. 362, 369 (2009) 
(“[T]he opinion appears to invite Congress to reconsider the various aspects of the 
VRA that raise the most serious constitutional concerns for the Court.”); Posting 
of Richard H. Pildes to Room for Debate: A Running Commentary on the News, A 
Warning to Congress http://roomfordebate.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/06/22/the-
battle-not-the-war-on-voting-rights/ (June 22, 2009, 13:15 EST) (noting that Justice 
Roberts in the opinion “strongly intimates that Section 5 might be living on 
borrowed time”).  
15 See, e.g., Bartlett v. Strickland, 129 S. Ct. 1231 (2009) (interpreting Section 2 
of the VRA to require minority groups to constitute a numerical majority of the 
voting-age population in a geographically compact area before proceeding on a 
claim of vote dilution); Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461 (2003) (reading Section 5 
of the VRA to permit States and local governments to spread minority voters 
across many districts, which might have the effect of diluting minority voting 
strength, rather than interpreting Section 5 to require States and local 
governments to draw district lines so minority voters have an ability to elect 
candidates of their choice); Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320 (2000) 
(holding that the Justice Department must approve certain racially discriminatory 
voting changes under Section 5, even if the Justice Department determines that 
the discrimination was intentional). 
16 Recently, commentators have been eager to write about the 
constitutionality of Section 5 of the VRA.  See, e.g., Kristen Clarke, The 
Congressional Record Underlying the 2006 Voting Rights Act: How Much 
Discrimination Can the Constitution Tolerate?, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 385, 394–95 
(2008) (arguing that the congressional record underlying the reauthorization of 
the VRA supports the constitutionality of the VRA); Nathaniel Persily, The Promise 
and Pitfalls of the New Voting Rights Act, 117 YALE L.J. 174, 189–90 (2007) 
(recounting how the issue of whether the Section 5 is constitutional was central to 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol31/iss4/5
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discussion of the role the VRA plays in helping the United States 
adhere to its international treaty obligations under the 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination17 (“CERD”) and the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (“ICCPR”).18 
This Comment addresses this overlooked aspect of the VRA, 
arguing that the extraordinary enforcement mechanism provided 
by the VRA uniquely facilitates U.S. compliance with international 
law in ways otherwise unattainable.  As an unusually strong 
expression of federal power, the VRA overcomes impediments to 
U.S. adherence to its international human rights obligations. 
The VRA represents one of the few federal statutory 
mechanisms in that it prohibits governmental conduct that has the 
purpose and/or effect of discriminating on the basis of race.19  This 
standard of discrimination is binding on all jurisdictions within the 
United States and can be enforced proactively by individuals and 
the U.S. government.  Nevertheless, beginning with the Rehnquist 
court, the Supreme Court has set new limitations on congressional 
power to combat racial discrimination.20  While these limitations 
certainly affect domestic law in that national standards set by 
Congress are met with increased judicial scrutiny, they also 
implicate U.S. capabilities to adhere to international human rights 
treaty obligations.  Thus, the debate over Congressional power to 
enforce equal protection and fundamental rights encompasses 
more than national interests: it touches on international law.  For 
 
the debate surrounding reauthorization of Section 5 in 2006); Pamela S. Karlan, 
Section 5 Squared: Congressional Power To Extend and Amend the Voting Rights Act, 44 
HOUS. L. REV. 1, 27–31 (2007) (arguing that Congress had the authority to 
reauthorize Section 5 of the VRA); Abigail Thernstrom, Section 5 of the Voting 
Rights Act: By Now, a Murky Mess, 5 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 41, 46 (2007) (arguing 
that Section 5 is unconstitutional and unnecessary). 
17 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, Nov. 20, 1994, 1966 U.S.T. 521, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 [hereinafter 
CERD]. 
18 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 1966 
U.S.T. 521, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
19 Apart from the VRA, Title VII remains the most notable federal effort to 
bar effects-based racial discrimination.  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2006).  Note, 
however, that at least one Supreme Court justice has recently questioned the 
constitutionality of Title VII’s disparate impact standard.  See Ricci v. DeStefano, 
129 S. Ct. 2658, 2682–83 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring) (suggesting that, as applied 
to government employers, Title VII’s disparate impact standard may violate the 
Equal Protection Clause). 
20 See infra text accompanying notes 87–89. 
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this reason, proponents of “bringing human rights home”21 can 
find in the VRA a vehicle that brings the United States into closer 
compliance with its international obligations.  Likewise, to the 
extent that appeals to international law can persuade the Supreme 
Court and those charged with administering the VRA, advocates 
for a strong VRA and for providing Congress with more latitude to 
enforce the Reconstruction Amendments should consider the role 
that the VRA plays in allowing the United States to adhere to 
international human rights law. 
After tracing the development of human rights law as part of 
American law, Section 2 of this Comment discusses the United 
States’ relatively recent adoption of the CERD and ICCPR.  It then 
analyzes how U.S. interpretation of the CERD and ICCPR has 
limited the effectiveness of the United States’ ability to adhere to 
both treaties.  Section 3 argues that, despite the United States’ 
failure to adhere fully to the CERD and ICCPR, the VRA has 
helped the United States move closer toward complying with 
international voting rights norms because of (i) the statute’s 
definition of discrimination, (ii) its unique “preclearance” 
component, and (iii) its granting of a private right of action.  
Finally, the Comment concludes in Section 4 by exploring whether 
this insight into the operation of the VRA can be applied to 
enforcing other human rights norms within the United States, and 
the impact that limits on congressional power to enforce the 
Reconstruction Amendments will have on U.S. adherence to 
human rights treaty obligations. 
2. BRINGING HUMAN RIGHTS HOME 
2.1. Past as Prologue 
Human rights are central to the United States’ history.  Over 
200 years ago, the Declaration of Independence stated that people 
are endowed with inherent, inalienable rights by virtue of being 
human.22  Over 60 years ago, the United States helped end 
 
21 See generally BRINGING HUMAN RIGHTS HOME (Cynthia Soohoo et al. eds., 
2008) (containing essays and articles by various authors on the importance of and 
values served by more robustly applying international human rights norms to 
conduct within the United States).  
22 See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776) (“[A]ll men are 
created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable 
Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.”). 
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genocide during World War II and then played an instrumental 
role in establishing international institutions aimed at securing and 
protecting human rights.23  Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Four Freedoms 
speech partly inspired the drafting of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights.24  His wife, Eleanor Roosevelt, served as Chair of 
the Commission on Human Rights and drafted part of the 
Universal Declaration on Human Rights.25 
Even so, international human rights norms have played a 
minor role in legal efforts to pursue fundamental rights, justice, 
and equality within the United States.  Lurking behind the 
Declaration of Independence stood the ugliness of slavery.  While 
Franklin D. Roosevelt was calling for a redefinition of “security” to 
include human security in his Four Freedoms speech, African 
Americans were condemned to live in “separate but equal” 
societies and Japanese Americans were sent to internment camps.  
In the wake of World War II, while the United States played a 
leading role in “the founding of the United Nations and the 
drafting of the U.N. Declaration of Human Rights, the reality for 
African Americans was the complete antithesis of the principles 
being advanced on the international level.”26 
Instead of confronting this schism by bringing its own practices 
in line with the international norms it helped to create, the United 
 
23 See JOHANNES MORSINK, THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: 
ORIGIN, DRAFTING AND INTENT 1–2 (1999) (describing how Franklin and Eleanor 
Roosevelt helped inspire the movement to push for international human rights).  
See also GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND 
MODERN DEMOCRACY 1019 (Transaction Publishers 1996) (1944) (discussing, in 
1944, the leadership role that the United States will play in democratizing the 
world and democratizing former colonies and particularly noting that 
“[d]eclarations of inalienable human rights for people all over the world are now 
emanating from America”). 
24 See MORSINK, supra note 23, at 1–2 (describing Roosevelt’s State of the 
Union in which he addressed “four freedoms” as a catalyst for early human rights 
advocates). 
25 See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, art. 1, 
U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948) (“All human 
beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.  They are endowed with 
reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of 
brotherhood.”); see also Gay J. McDougall, Toward a Meaningful International 
Regime: The Domestic Relevance of International Efforts to Eliminate All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, 40 HOW. L.J. 571, 575 (1997) (noting that Eleanor Roosevelt 
assumed an “international leadership role[] in the founding of the United Nations 
and the drafting of the U.N. Declaration of Human Rights”).   
26 McDougall, supra note 25. 
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States retreated from the burgeoning system of universal rights.27  
The United States failed to join the most significant human rights 
treaties created in furtherance of the goals set out in the United 
Nations Charter28 and the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights29—two documents heavily influenced by U.S. participation.  
Isolationists and advocates for segregation in the name of “states’ 
rights” were able to find common ground in the pursuit of 
preventing international scrutiny of Jim Crow.30  The Cold War 
and McCarthyism intervened to shift the focus of U.S. social justice 
activists away from demanding economic and social rights, which 
were thought to have too close a resemblance to communism.  
Instead, U.S. advocates turned their attention to achieving civil 
rights that had greater appeal domestically, such as voting rights 
and employment discrimination.31 
The international institutions established after World War II 
presented a new opportunity for civil rights advocates in the 
United States.  With the legacy of Nazi Germany’s doctrine of 
racial supremacy lingering in the background, the drafters of the 
U.N. Charter made clear their desire to establish the United 
Nations in order to attain “human rights . . . for all without 
distinction as to race.”32  In 1947, following the creation of the 
Human Rights Commission of the United Nations, the NAACP 
filed a petition under the leadership of W.E.B. Du Bois—An Appeal 
to the World—which called for the Human Rights Commission to 
investigate the conditions under which African Americans lived in 
 
27 See id. at 576 (describing how the U.S. distanced itself from the U.N. human 
rights treaty regime). 
28 U.N. Charter, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993. 
29 See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 25. 
30 See Carol Anderson, A “Hollow Mockery”: African Americans, White 
Supremacy, and the Development of Human Rights in the United States, in 1 BRINGING 
HUMAN RIGHTS HOME, A HISTORY OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 90 
(Cynthia Soohoo et al. eds., 2008) (explaining that an “’evil combination’ of GOP 
and Dixiecrats, as the NAACP called it, charged that the U.S. Constitution and 
America were under attack by human rights, human rights proponents, and the 
United Nations, as that foreigner-dominated organization set out to subvert 
American values with socialistic, even communistic, ideas about freedom and 
democracy”). 
31 See Preface to 1 BRINGING HUMAN RIGHTS HOME: A HISTORY OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES, at ix (Cynthia Soohoo et al. eds., 2008) (discussing 
impediments to appealing to international human rights in the U.S. following 
creation of the United Nations).  
32 U.N. Charter, supra note 28, art. 1, para. 3.  
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the United States.33  Although the petition was defeated (and 
opposed by the United States) in a U.N. Sub-Commission, the 
petition was well-publicized and helped influence the U.S. 
government.34 
The efforts of Du Bois and others seeking to leverage 
international human rights law as a tool for reform within the 
United States met considerable resistance in the early 1950s from 
Senator John W. Bricker of Ohio, who led a movement to amend 
the Constitution to alter the treaty approval process.  In 1920, the 
Supreme Court held in Missouri v. Holland that an act of Congress 
pursuant to a validly executed treaty could go beyond Congress’s 
otherwise enumerated powers and still remain constitutional 
pursuant to the Tenth Amendment, provided that such an act of 
Congress did not violate an express provision of the Constitution.35  
Thus, under Holland, when enforcing the mandate of a treaty, 
Congress can enact legislation that binds states through the 
Supremacy Clause in ways that otherwise might run afoul of 
federalism constraints.36  For Senator Bricker and his followers, 
Holland was a threat to state sovereignty and, if coupled with 
emerging human rights treaties, could enable a serious disruption 
of segregation and the Cold War.37 
Senator Bricker’s amendment—commonly referred to as “the 
Bricker Amendment”—was introduced in many forms.  At its core, 
it aimed to make U.S. accession to any international human rights 
treaty nearly impossible.  Various versions of the treaty would 
have required Senate ratification of executive agreements in 
addition to treaties, that both types of agreements (executive 
 
33 See Anderson, supra note 30, at 89 (discussing the strength of the NAACP’s 
petition). 
34 See Stanley A. Halpin, Looking Over a Crowd and Picking Your Friends: Civil 
Rights and the Debate Over the Influence of Foreign and International Human Rights 
Law on the Interpretation of the U.S. Constitution, 30 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 
1, 5–6 (2006) (discussing the impact that An Appeal to the World and other petitions 
filed to international bodies had on U.S. diplomatic relations). 
35 Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920). 
36 See id.  
37 See Halpin, supra note 34, at 8; see also United States Policy Regarding the 
Draft United Nations on Human Rights: The 1953 Change, in 3 FOREIGN RELATIONS OF 
THE UNITED STATES 1952-1954, at 1550–51 (1952) (“Covenants would be a source of 
propaganda attack on positions taken by the United States and on conditions 
within this country.  The Covenants might contain provisions on economic self-
determination and the right of nationalization which would be detrimental to 
United States interests in certain areas abroad.”). 
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agreements and treaties) pass through both houses of Congress 
with enabling legislation, and that such agreements gain approval 
in all 48 state legislatures.38  The Bricker Amendment would have 
effectively overruled Holland, leaving all treaties as non-self-
executing (i.e., not enforceable in U.S. courts) without enabling 
legislation.  Senator Bricker clearly stated his purpose as it related 
to what would eventually become the ICCPR.  He wanted “‘to 
bury the so-called Covenant on Human Rights so deep that no one 
holding high public office will ever attempt its resurrection.’”39 
Ultimately, vigorous lobbying by the Eisenhower 
Administration succeeded in derailing the Bricker Amendment by 
promising that the United States would not agree to any future 
human rights treaties.40  As a result of Eisenhower’s pledge, the 
United States did not participate in the development and drafting 
of CERD and ICCPR, and neither treaty was ratified by the United 
States until the Clinton Administration.41 
2.2. Ratification and General Obligations of the CERD and ICCPR 
The International Convention on the Elimination of All forms 
of Racial Discrimination was adopted by the U.N. General 
Assembly and opened for signature in late 1965.42  The 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights was adopted 
and opened for signature the next year.43  Yet, neither treaty was 
submitted to the Senate for ratification until the Carter 
Administration,44 and both treaties lingered in the Senate until the 
Clinton Administration.  The Senate ratified the ICCPR in 199245 
and two years later ratified the CERD.46  Under the Supremacy 
Clause of the U.S. Constitution, both treaties are the law of the 
 
38 See Anderson, supra note 30, at 91 (discussing the requirements under the 
Bricker amendment). 
39 Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Conventions: The Ghost of 
Senator Bricker, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 341, 349 (1995). 
40 See id. 
41 See McDougall, supra note 25, at 576. 
42 CERD, supra note 17. 
43 ICCPR, supra note 18. 
44 See HENRY J. STEINER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: 
LAW, POLITICS, MORALS 1135 (3d ed. 2008). 
45 See 138 CONG. REC. 8,068–71 (1992) (ratifying the ICCPR). 
46 See 140 CONG. REC. 14,326–27 (1994) (ratifying the CERD). 
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United States, having the same effect as an act of Congress.47  The 
CERD attacks racial discrimination across a broad array of rights.  
Meanwhile, the ICCPR requires its signatories to protect a more 
defined set of civil and political rights.  In addition, unlike the 
CERD, the ICCPR mandates that State signatories protect citizens 
and non-citizens alike.48 
Together, the ICCPR and the CERD firmly establish the 
fundamental human right to political participation, regardless of 
race, color, national origin, and ethnic origin.  The ICCPR contains 
a general statement of nondiscrimination, elaborating in Article 
2(1) that each party to the ICCPR must guarantee “rights 
recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any 
kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other 
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.”49  
Article 1 of the CERD bans racial discrimination, which it defines 
as:  
[A]ny distinction . . . based on race . . . which has the 
purpose or effect of . . . nullifying or impairing the 
recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, 
economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life.50 
The ICCPR and the CERD collectively prohibit governmental 
conduct that has the purpose or effect of racial discrimination. 
Both treaties confer affirmative obligations upon their 
signatories to pursue policies in furtherance of guaranteeing the 
right to political participation free from racial discrimination.  
Under the CERD, States are required to refrain from engaging in 
racial discrimination and to act affirmatively “to amend, rescind or 
nullify any laws and regulations which have the effect of creating 
or perpetuating racial discrimination . . . . ”51  Article 2 of the 
 
47 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. (“[A]ll Treaties made, or which shall be made, 
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . 
. ”). 
48 Compare CERD, supra note 17, art. 1(2) (“This Convention shall not apply to 
distinctions, exclusions, restrictions or preferences made by a State Party to this 
Convention between citizens and non-citizens.”), with ICCPR, supra note 18, art. 
2(1) (establishing that each party to the covenant must ensure equal rights to all 
individuals within its territory). 
49 ICCPR, supra note 18, art. 2(1). 
50 CERD, supra note 17, art. 1(1). 
51 Id. art. 2(1)(c). 
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ICCPR contains a similar provision.52  Whereas Article 1 of the 
CERD exempts affirmative action programs from the definition of 
discrimination, Article 2 of the CERD—in addition to Article 2 of 
the ICCPR—mandates State parties to engage in affirmative action 
when necessary.  That is, States are not only permitted to engage in 
affirmative action programs, but—in some instances—required to 
do so. 
Moreover, signatories of the CERD agree not only to comply 
with the treaty’s terms at the national level, but at all levels of 
government.53  The CERD specifically contemplates that States 
have an obligation to implement its terms at all levels of 
government—in the United States’ case, at state and local levels.  In 
less specific language, the ICCPR also requires implementation of 
its terms at all levels of government, requiring that each State Party 
to the ICCPR “undertake[] to respect and to ensure to all 
individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the 
rights recognized in the [ICCPR].”54 
The mandates not to discriminate laid out in the CERD and 
ICCPR apply to the right to free political participation.  The CERD 
generally guarantees equal protection under the law and 
enumerates specific civil, political and social rights that States are 
prohibited from interfering with through discriminatory conduct.55  
Specifically, Article 5(c) of the CERD requires State Parties to 
“undertake to prohibit and to eliminate racial discrimination . . . to 
guarantee . . . the enjoyment of . . . the right[] to participate in 
elections—to vote and to stand for election—on the basis of 
universal and equal suffrage.”56  Likewise, Article 25 of the ICCPR 
guarantees the right to vote without “distinctions” and 
“unreasonable restrictions.”57 
 
52 See ICCPR, supra note 18, art. 2(2) (“[E]ach State Party . . . undertakes . . . to 
adopt such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the 
rights recognized in the present Covenant.”). 
53 See id. art. 2(3)(c) (“Each State Party . . . undertakes . . . [t]o ensure that the 
competent authorities shall enforce such remedies when granted.”). 
54 Id. art. 2(1). 
55 See CERD, supra note 17, art. 5 (obliging states to prohibit and eliminate 
discrimination as to race, color, ethnic, and national origin). 
56 Id. art. 5(c). 
57 ICCPR, supra note 18, art. 25. 
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Under international law, the United States is bound to carry 
out treaty obligations to which it has assented.58  International 
enforcement of both treaties is left to a combination of monitoring 
bodies that rely on periodic reporting by State Parties, complaints 
by States Parties, and—upon a State Party’s consent—individual 
complaints.59  However, under the ICCPR, a State Party is not 
subject to the State Party complaint mechanism unless it separately 
declares the competence of the Human Rights Commission to 
receive and consider complaints.60  Likewise, a State Party is not 
subject to the ICCPR’s individual complaint mechanism unless it 
assents to the ICCPR’s First Optional Protocol.  The United States 
has declared the Human Rights Commission competent to hear 
State Party complaints61 but has not ratified the ICCPR’s First 
 
58 See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 735 (2004) (declaring that “the 
[ICCPR] does bind the United States as a matter of international law”); Henkin, 
supra note 39, at 346 (“International law requires the United States to carry out its 
treaty obligations . . .”).  
59 See CERD, supra note 17, arts. 8–9 (establishing a Committee on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination to monitor compliance with the CERD and  
requiring States Parties to submit periodic reports on laws and other measures 
that have been adopted in furtherance of the provisions of the CERD); id. art. 11 
(allowing a State Party to file a complaint if such a State Party believes that 
another State Party is failing to give effect to provisions of the CERD); id. art. 14 
(allowing individual complaints from a State Party if such a Party has 
“recognize[d] the competence of the Committee to receive and consider 
communications from individuals or groups of individuals within its 
jurisdiction”); ICCPR, supra note 17, arts. 28, 40 (establishing a Human Rights 
Committee to monitor compliance with the ICCPR and require State Parties to 
submit periodic reports); id. art. 41 (allowing a State Party to file a complaint that 
another State Party is not fulfilling its obligations under the ICCPR); Optional 
Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for 
signature Dec. 16, 1966, art. 2, 999 U.N.T.S. 302 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) 
(permitting individuals who have exhausted all available domestic remedies and 
who have asserted violation of their rights under the ICCPR to submit a written 
communication to the Human Rights Committee on the condition that the written 
communication concerns a State Party which is a party to the Optional Protocol). 
60 See ICCPR, supra note 18, art. 41(1) (giving State Parties recourse to the 
Human Rights Committee in situations where a State Party feels that “another 
State is not fulfilling its obligations under the present Covenant”). 
61 See U.S. Ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, June 8, 1992, 1676 U.N.T.S. 543, 545, available at 
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_ 
no=IV-4&chapter=4&lang=en#EndDec [hereinafter ICCPR RUDs] (“The United 
States declares that it accepts the competence of the Human Rights Committee to 
receive and consider communications under article 41 in which a State party 
claims that another State party is not fulfilling its obligations under the 
Covenant.”). 
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Optional Protocol,62 thereby disallowing individual complaints 
under the ICCPR.  
Unlike the ICCPR, States automatically recognize the 
competence of the CERD monitoring body—the Committee on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination—to consider complaints by 
other State Parties, and the International Court of Justice maintains 
a form of appellate jurisdiction over disputes before the CERD’s 
monitoring body.63  However, the United States has unilaterally 
declared that it is not subject to the International Court of Justice 
without consent.64  In addition, to date, no State Party has 
attempted to avail itself of this procedure.65  Furthermore, the 
CERD’s individual complaint mechanism hinges on whether a 
State Party has recognized the competence of the monitoring body 
to hear complaints related to that State’s conduct,66 and the U.S. 
has not made such recognition.67 
As a result of the United States’ maneuvers related to the 
respective monitoring bodies and complaint mechanisms of the 
ICCPR and CERD, the United States is subject to little international 
enforcement of its obligations under both treaties.  For the United 
States, what is left of the international enforcement mechanisms 
provided by the ICCPR and CERD amount to each treaty’s 
reporting requirements, which initiate a healthy process of 
 
62 Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, March 23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 302, available at http://www2.ohchr 
.org/english/law/pdf/ccpr-one.pdf.  
63 See CERD, supra note 17, art. 11 (governing recourse to the Committee 
when other State Parties are not “giving effect to the provisions of [the] 
Convention”); id. art. 22 (granting the ICJ jurisdiction to hear appeals). 
64 See U.S. Ratification of the International Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Oct. 21, 1994, 1830 U.N.T.S. 284, 285, available 
at http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-
2&chapter=4&lang=en [hereinafter CERD RUDs] (“[B]efore any dispute to which 
the United States is a party may be submitted to the jurisdiction of the 
International Court of Justice under this article, the specific consent of the United 
States is required in each case.”). 
65 See Human Rights Bodies—Complaints Procedures: Inter-State 
Complaints, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/petitions/index.htm 
#interstate (last visited Apr. 10, 2010) (noting that the inter-state complaint 
procedures have never been used). 
66 See CERD, supra note 17, art. 14 (“A State Party may at any time declare 
that it recognizes the competence of the committee to consider communications 
from individuals . . . claiming to be victims of a violation by that State Party of . . . 
rights set forth in this Convention.”). 
67 See CERD RUDs, supra note 64. 
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introspection by the United States and potential criticism by the 
international community, but remain void of any threat of 
sanctions. 
2.3. Roadblocks to Implementation 
In part, robustly applying human rights norms within the 
United States serves America’s legacy of support for inalienable 
rights around the globe.  The ability of the United States to hold 
other States accountable for their human rights abuses is affected 
by its own commitment to enforcing human rights norms.  By 
promoting a principled human rights policy within its borders, the 
United States can gain credibility abroad when it criticizes the 
human rights policies of other countries.68  Yet, as discussed, the 
United States has been wary of holding its own policies to 
international human rights standards. 
When the Senate ratified both the CERD and ICCPR, it issued 
an accompanying “package” of reservations, understandings, and 
declarations (“RUDs”) that constrain the capacity for U.S. 
adherence to both treaties.69  Thus, although the Supremacy Clause 
states that “all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the 
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the 
Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby . . . . ,” 
70 the Constitution is seemingly clear language is obscured by the 
RUDs attached to both the CERD and ICCPR.  Although the terms 
of the right to political participation guaranteed by the CERD and 
ICCPR may be broader than current U.S. policies, the RUDs 
 
68 See President Barack Obama, Remarks at the Acceptance of the Nobel 
Peace Prize (Dec. 10, 2009) available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/remarks-president-acceptance-nobel-peace-prize (“America—in fact, no 
nation—can insist that others follow the rules of the road if we refuse to follow 
them ourselves.  For when we don’t, our actions can appear arbitrary, and 
undercut the legitimacy of future interventions, no matter how justified.”).  See 
also WILLIAM F. SCHULZ, Introduction to THE FUTURE OF HUMAN RIGHTS: U.S. POLICY 
FOR A NEW ERA 13–14 (William F. Schulz ed., 2008) (recommending that the new 
administration conform its practices to international standards on human rights, 
otherwise the “United States will never reclaim its reputation for human rights 
leadership . . . “). 
69 See ICCPR RUDs, supra note 61, at 543–45 (laying out the U.S. reservations, 
declarations, and understandings with respect to the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights).   
70 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (emphasis added); see also JORDAN J. PAUST, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 99–105, 120 (2d ed. 2003) 
(discussing the clash between treaty law and U.S. domestic law and examining the 
various judicially created doctrines to deal with the problem). 
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asserted by the United States with respect to both treaties work to 
limit any obligation by the United States to bring domestic policies 
in line with international standards.71 
With respect to both treaties, the United States issued a proviso 
that states that neither treaty requires the United States to enact 
any legislation or take action that would violate the U.S. 
Constitution as interpreted by the United States.72  Although the 
validity of these provisos under international law has been 
questioned,73 they have had great import concerning the 
interpretation and steps taken in pursuit of compliance with the 
CERD.  Certainly, under U.S. law, treaties are subject to 
constitutional limitations and the government should not enforce 
treaty provisions that are inconsistent with the Constitution.74  
Nevertheless, the U.S. government remains responsible for 
adhering to the terms and conditions of both the ICCPR and CERD 
to the extent that the Constitution permits.  While the Constitution 
may restrict the government from engaging in some programs 
aimed at adhering to the CERD, the government is still required to 
find ways to “undertake to prohibit and to eliminate racial 
discrimination.”75 
 
71 See Henkin, supra note 39, at 342 (describing the United States’ obligation to 
enter reservations in international treaties whose effect could be in conflict with 
the Constitution); McDougall, supra note 25, at 584 (noting “points of divergence” 
between existing U.S. law and the definition of racial discrimination under the 
CERD). 
72 See 140 CONG. REC. 14,326 (1994) (“Nothing in this Convention requires or 
authorizes legislation, or other action, by the United States of America prohibited 
by the Constitution of the United States as interpreted by the United States.”); 138 
CONG. REC. 8,071 (1992) (including exactly the same proviso).  
73 See Letters from Amnesty International, Yale Law School Professors, and 
Professors of Law from the University of Florida, reprinted in 138 CONG. REC. 
8,068–70 (1992) (expressing deep concern with respect to the RUDs attached to the 
ratification of the ICCPR); see also Connie de la Vega, Civil Rights During the 1990s: 
New Treaty Law Could Help Immensely, 65 U. CIN. L. REV. 423, 431 (1997) (citing 
Symposium, The Ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 1167 (1993)) (“[D]espite the active role of the United 
States in the formation and elaboration of the ICCPR, the Senate did not 
immediately give its ‘advice and consent.’”). See generally William A. Schabas, 
Invalid Reservations to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Is the 
United States Still a Party?, 21 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 277 (1995) (exploring the validity of 
the U.S. RUDs to the ICCPR). 
74 See Henkin, supra note 39, at 342 (citing Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16 (1957) 
and RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 111(2) (1987)) (proposing that 
cases arising under international law or international agreements of the United 
States are subject to Constitutional and statutory limitations). 
75 CERD, supra note 17, art. 5. 
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The U.S. Supreme Court has reduced the scope of government 
conduct that constitutes impermissible discrimination under the 
U.S. Constitution.  In order for a law or practice to be deemed 
impermissibly discriminatory under the U.S. Constitution, the 
Supreme Court has interpreted the Equal Protection Clause of the 
U.S. Constitution to require that such a law or practice have been 
enacted or administered with a discriminatory purpose.76  
Accordingly, in order for an individual or group to petition the 
judiciary for relief from a law or practice that has the effect of 
discriminating on the basis of race, that individual or group must 
also show discriminatory intent.  This interpretation clearly limits 
the definition of “racial discrimination” within the CERD, which 
includes “any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based 
on race . . . which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing 
. . . human rights and fundamental freedom.”77  U.S. reliance on the 
Supreme Court’s interpretation of unconstitutional discrimination 
severely limits U.S. compliance with the CERD and ICCPR.  As an 
NGO response organized by the U.S. Human Rights Network to 
the most recent U.S. report to the Committee on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Racial Discrimination points out, requiring that a 
plaintiff prove discriminatory intent “understate[s] the cumulative 
impact of discrimination.”78  Discrimination that results from 
institutional interactions and cumulative events may not be 
intentional, and yet still have a serious disparate impact on racial 
and ethnic minorities.79 
 
76 See McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987) (holding that proof of 
discriminatory impact of the administration of the death penalty in Georgia was 
insufficient by itself to show the existence of a policy that violates the Equal 
Protection clause); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (holding that proof of 
discriminatory impact of an applicant examination on African Americans was 
insufficient by itself to show the existence of a policy that violates the Equal 
Protection Clause). 
77 CERD, supra note 17, art. 1 (emphasis added).  Note, however, that Article 
4 of the CERD does restrict the enactment and implementation of “special 
measures” that create permanent separate rights for a group.  Id. art. 4; see also 
ICCPR, supra note 18, art. 26. (declaring in international law the equality of all 
members of a country and that they should not be discriminated against). 
78 LISA CROOMS, U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS NETWORK, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: A 
SUMMARY OF U.S. NGO RESPONSES TO THE U.S. 2007 COMBINED PERIODIC REPORTS TO 
THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF RACIAL 
DISCRIMINATION para. 10 (2008), available at http://www.ushrnetwork.org/files 
/ushrn/images/linkfiles/CERD/0_Executive%20Summary.pdf.  
79 Id. 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
1166 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 31:4 
 
The Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Equal Protection 
Clause also curtails the government’s ability to enact and engage in 
affirmative action programs, which—by design—involve 
intentional discrimination.  Although the Supreme Court has not 
banned affirmative action programs altogether, current doctrine 
allows for such programs only in limited circumstances.  A 
governmental affirmative action program must pass the test of 
“strict scrutiny.”80  In reviewing affirmative action programs with 
strict scrutiny, the Supreme Court has held that affirmative action 
programs violate the Equal Protection Clause unless the 
governmental program is narrowly tailored to meet a compelling 
governmental interest.81  The Court currently recognizes two 
compelling interests that justify affirmative action programs: the 
attainment of a diverse learning environment in education;82 and, 
efforts aimed at remedying specific instances of past discrimination 
in the context of government contracting and employment.83  In 
contrast, the standards laid out in the ICCPR and CERD do not 
submit race-based affirmative action programs to an analysis 
under the tiers of scrutiny.84  The CERD specifically exempts from 
its definition of discrimination any governmental actions taken 
that “may be necessary in order to ensure . . . equal enjoyment or 
exercise of human rights and fundamental freedoms . . . . ”85  
Similarly, the U.N. Human Rights Committee interprets the ICCPR 
to permit affirmative action programs that have a legitimate end 
 
80 See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 291 (1978) (holding 
that strict scrutiny should apply to affirmative action programs and that “[r]acial 
and ethnic distinctions of any sort are inherently suspect and thus call for the 
most exacting judicial examination”). 
81 See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 
783  (2007) (Kennedy, J. concurring)  (affirming in the controlling opinion that “[i]t 
is well established that when a governmental policy is subjected to strict scrutiny, 
‘the government has the burden of proving that racial classifications ‘are narrowly 
tailored measures that further compelling governmental interests’”).  
82 See id. (“Diversity, depending on its meaning and definition, is a 
compelling educational goal a school district may pursue.”). 
83 See Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (holding that a 
compelling interest exists to remedy past discrimination only if the governmental 
entity employing the affirmative action program can identify past discrimination 
within its jurisdiction against the racial minority it seeks to benefit). 
84 See Halpin, supra note 34, at 33. (“In international human rights law, 
analysis of discrimination does not formally use tiers of scrutiny as practiced by 
U.S. courts.”). 
85 CERD, supra note 17, art. 1(4). 
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and reasonable means—similar to the less-demanding rational 
basis standard applied in U.S. courts.86 
Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme Court has reshaped Congress’s 
power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to enact 
legislation that prohibits discriminatory conduct by State and local 
governments and governmental actors.  As a general matter, 
Rehnquist Court precedents established that Congress may only 
outlaw governmental conduct that is intentionally designed to 
discriminate on the basis of race.  More specifically, under a line of 
cases beginning with City of Boerne v. Flores, Congress may prohibit 
governmental conduct that has only the effect—and not necessarily 
the purpose—of discriminating on the basis of race if the means 
adopted by Congress to prohibit effects-based discrimination is 
“congruent and proportional” to the evil it seeks to remedy.87  
Thus, Section 5 grants Congress broad power to remedy and deter 
constitutional violations, even if the underlying conduct it 
prohibits is not itself unconstitutional.  In 2006, Congress exercised 
its power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment when 
reauthorizing the Voting Rights Act—thereby renewing a statutory 
scheme that generally prohibits conduct and activity that has the 
purpose or effect of denying the right to vote on the basis of race.88  
As discussed, the Court in NAMUDNO upheld the preclearance 
component of the VRA, but signaled a willingness to invalidate the 
component in a future case.89  Thus, if given the opportunity in a 
future case, the Roberts Court may further limit the extent to which 
Congress can proscribe effects-based racial discrimination 
perpetrated by state and local governments. 
In addition to the aforementioned proviso with respect to both 
treaties, the U.S. attached to both the ICCPR and CERD an 
understanding that qualifies the federal government’s obligation to 
 
86 See Halpin, supra note 34, at 35 (“[T]he U.N. Human Rights Committee 
interprets the ICCPR as requiring a ‘legitimate’ end and a ‘reasonable’ means, 
which parallels low-level equal-protection scrutiny in American constitutional 
law.”). 
87 See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (holding that Congress 
may only provide remedies for rights recognized by the judiciary branch and that 
Congress may only enact statutory schemes to enforce such rights that are 
“congruent and proportional” to preventing and remedying the violation of such 
court-defined rights). 
88 See infra Section 3. 
89 See supra text accompanying notes 8–13 (discussing the holding and 
reasoning of the Court in NAMUDNO). 
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adhere to both treaties only to the extent that the federal 
government may exercise jurisdiction over state and local 
governments.90  Article 2(1) of the CERD specifically requires that 
State Parties facilitate and coordinate compliance with the CERD at 
state and local levels.91  The ICCPR similarly binds all State Parties 
to ensure compliance at all levels of government.92  Effectively, the 
U.S.’s “federalism understanding” (i.e., the formal understanding 
asserted by the U.S.) significantly exempts the national 
government from compelling state and local governments—which 
are responsible for adopting and executing a considerable portion 
of laws, policies, and practices that affect individuals in the U.S.—
to adhere to both treaties.  Perhaps as a result of this 
understanding, the U.S. has done little to implement the ICCPR 
and CERD at state and local levels.93  Although President Clinton 
established an Interagency Working Group on Human Rights that 
coordinated federal agency adherence to international human 
rights treaties, the Working Group remained limited to federal 
compliance with international law.94  Moreover, President George 
W. Bush largely abandoned the order, and it remains to be seen the 
 
90 The Senate ratified both the ICCPR and CERD with the same 
“Understanding,” which states in relevant part that each treaty “shall be 
implemented by the Federal Government to the extent that it exercises jurisdiction 
over the matters covered therein, and otherwise by the state and local 
governments.  To the extent that state and local governments exercise jurisdiction 
over such matters, the Federal Government shall, as necessary, take appropriate 
measures to ensure the fulfillment of [each treaty].”  See CERD RUDs, supra note 
64 (laying out the U.S. reservations, declarations, and understandings with respect 
to the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination); ICCPR RUDs, supra note 61 (laying out the U.S. reservations, 
declarations, and understandings with respect to the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights). 
91 See CERD, supra note 17, art. 2(1)(a) (“Each State Party undertakes to 
engage in no act or practice of racial discrimination against persons, groups of 
persons or institutions and to en sure [sic] that all public authorities and public 
institutions, national and local, shall act in conformity with this obligation.”). 
92 See ICCPR, supra note 18, art. 2(1) (declaring that each State Party agrees 
“to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the 
rights recognized in the [ICCPR]”). 
93 See, e.g., Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 72nd Sess., 
Concluding Observations of the Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination: 
United States of America, para. 13, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/USA/CO/6 (May 8, 2008) 
(recommending “that the State party establish appropriate mechanisms to ensure 
a co-ordinated approach towards the implementation of the Convention at the 
federal, state and local levels”). 
94 See Exec. Order No. 13107, 63 Fed. Reg. 68,991, 68,991–92 (Dec. 10, 1998).  
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extent to which President Obama will further the order’s goals.95  
Accordingly, no institution exists within the U.S. to monitor 
compliance with the ICCPR and CERD at state and local 
governments.   
The United States’ federalism understanding is not necessarily 
compelled by the Constitution.  Although the Supreme Court’s 
recent jurisprudence has constrained the power of the federal 
government to regulate states and local governments,96 the federal 
government’s jurisdiction over state and local governments 
remains broad.97  Moreover, under Holland, the Tenth Amendment 
hardly limits Congressional efforts to compel states to adhere to 
international treaties.98  Given the powers available to Congress 
under the Commerce Clause, Fourteenth Amendment, and its 
treaty power, the federal government likely could coordinate and 
compel more robust state and local compliance with the CERD and 
ICCPR. 
Finally, the United States attached a declaration to the 
ratification of both treaties stating that the substantive terms of the 
treaties are not self-executing.99  This non-self-executing 
declaration restricts the use of U.S. judicial power from enforcing 
violations of both treaties.  As a result of the non-self-executing 
declaration, individuals lack an independent, private cause of 
 
95 See Eric P. Schwartz, Building Human Rights into the Government 
Infrastructure, in THE FUTURE OF HUMAN RIGHTS: U.S. POLICY FOR A NEW ERA 233, 
235 (William F. Schultz ed., 2008) (noting that the Bush administration did not 
implement the “program of action” envisioned by the order). 
96 See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (holding that 
Congress exceeded its power under the Commerce Clause in passing the Violence 
Against Women Act); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (holding that 
Congress exceeded its power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment by allowing 
for a civil suit provision against states when enacting the Religious Freedom and 
Restoration Act); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (invalidating, for the 
first time since the Great Depression, congressional action pursuant to the 
Commerce Clause). 
97 See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (upholding Congress’s power 
to ban the use of marijuana even when States permit its use inside their own 
border); Nevada Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003) (finding that 
Congress did not exceed its enforcement powers under the Fourteenth 
Amendment when enacting the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993). 
98 See generally Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920) (finding Congress 
unrestrained by its enumerated powers, specifically the Tenth Amendment, when 
working to effectuate the terms of a treaty). 
99 See CERD RUDs, supra note 65 (declaring the U.S. acceptance of the treaty 
to be not self-executing); ICCPR RUDs, supra note 69 (declaring the U.S. 
acceptance of the treaty to be not self-executing). 
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action to enforce either human rights treaty.100  The U.S. non-self-
executing declaration effectively precludes U.S. courts from 
providing judicial relief for violations of the rights established by 
both treaties.  Rather, in order for either treaty to have any legal 
effect in U.S. courts, Congress must pass separate “implementing 
legislation.”101 
In sum, through a combination of RUDs and a proviso, the U.S. 
has weakened the force with which the CERD and ICCPR apply. 
3. BRINGING HUMAN RIGHTS HOME THROUGH THE VOTING RIGHTS 
ACT 
3.1. A Unique Mechanism 
The Voting Rights Act has altered American democracy by 
creating a robust mechanism to enforce the promise of the 
Fifteenth Amendment.  Principally, the VRA enforces the right to 
vote through three mechanisms.  First, Section 2 of the VRA allows 
aggrieved individuals and the federal government to enforce the 
VRA’s prohibition of voting practices or procedures that have the 
purpose or effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on 
account of race or ethnicity.102  Section 2 applies nationwide.  
Second, when enacted in 1965, Section 4 of the VRA contained a 
formula that identified state and local jurisdictions with 
particularly egregious histories of denying the right vote on the 
basis of race and, within those jurisdictions, suspended the use of 
certain “tests or devices” that determine the eligibility of the right 
to vote (such as literacy tests and tests for “moral character”).103  
Third, Section 5 provides that the jurisdictions covered by Section 4 
must obtain “preclearance” from the federal government before 
making changes in voting practices or procedures.104  To obtain 
 
100 See Henkin, supra note 39 at 346–47 (noting that the non-self-executing 
declaration is “designed to keep its own judges from judging the human rights 
conditions in the [United States] by international standards.”); Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 734 (2004) (holding that “although the [ICCPR] does bind 
the United States as a matter of international law, the United States ratified the 
Covenant on the express understanding that it was not self-executing and so did 
not itself create obligations enforceable in the federal courts”). 
101 McDougall, Toward a Meaningful International Regime, supra note 26, at 588. 
102 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2006). 
103 Id. 
104 Id. §§ 1973b–1973c (2006). 
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preclearance from the federal government, a covered jurisdiction 
must show that a proposed change in election law has neither a 
discriminatory purpose nor discriminatory effect.105 
Together, these provisions of the VRA aim to destroy barriers 
to full exercise of the right to vote.  For nearly one hundred years 
under Jim Crow, African-American suffrage in the South was 
nearly eradicated through a combination of state-sponsored laws, 
intimidation, fraud, and violence.106  For all intents and purposes, 
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments were a “dead letter” in 
the South.107  Prior to enacting the VRA, Congress attempted to 
facilitate case-by-case litigation by the Attorney General against 
intransigent southern jurisdictions to force compliance with the 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments through the Civil Rights 
Acts of 1957, 1960, and 1964.  Through the Civil Rights Act of 1957, 
Congress authorized the Attorney General to enjoin public and 
private practices that interfered with the right to vote on the basis 
of race.108  The Civil Rights Act of 1960 allowed federal authorities 
to inspect local voter rolls and impose penalties upon individuals 
and jurisdictions that impeded access to registration.109  Finally, 
Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 further attempted to remedy 
discrimination in voting by requiring equal application of voting 
requirements and providing expedited judicial procedures for 
cases involving the right to vote.110 
The litigation brought by the Justice Department under the 
Civil Rights Acts of 1957, 1960, and 1964 to remedy discrimination 
in voting resulted in only piecemeal gains.  The Supreme Court 
noted the problems inherent in relying solely on litigation initiated 
by the Attorney General, observing that: 
 
105 Id. 
106 See Chandler Davidson, The Recent Evolution of Voting Rights Law Affecting 
Racial and Language Minorities, in QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH: THE IMPACT OF 
THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT 1965–1990, at 21 (Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofman, 
eds., 1994) (describing the whittling away of African–American suffrage after the 
civil war). 
107 Id. at 21–22. 
108 Civil Rights Act of 1957, Pub L. No. 85–315, 71 Stat. 634, 637 (1957) 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (2006)). 
109 Civil Rights Act of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86–449; 74 Stat. 86, 88 (1960) (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 18 and 42 U.S.C. (2006)). 
110 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88–352, 78 Stat. 241, 241 (1964). 
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Voting suits are unusually onerous to prepare, sometimes 
requiring as many as 6,000 man-hours spent combing 
through registration records in preparation for trial.  
Litigation has been exceedingly slow, in part because of the 
ample opportunities for delay afforded voting officials and 
others involved in the proceedings.  Even when favorable 
decisions have finally been obtained, some of the States 
affected have merely switched to discriminatory devices 
not covered by the federal decrees or have enacted difficult 
new tests designed to prolong the existing disparity 
between white and Negro registration.  Alternatively, 
certain local officials have defied and evaded court orders 
or have simply closed their registration offices to freeze the 
voting rolls.111 
Thus, by enacting a comprehensive scheme to attack 
discrimination through the VRA, Congress dramatically changed 
course in attempting to remedy almost a century of intransigent 
state actors who defied federal court orders. 
Congress determined that “the unsuccessful remedies which it 
had prescribed in the past would have to be replaced by sterner 
and more elaborate measures in order to satisfy the commands of 
the Fifteenth Amendment.”112  Congress opted for a strong 
enforcement mechanism that, as noted, allowed for enforcement by 
private individuals and suspension of discriminatory tests.  By 
providing for private enforcement of the VRA’s prohibitions 
through Section 2, the framers of the VRA opted not to rely solely 
on the Attorney General to deter, enforce, and remedy racial 
discrimination in voting.  Instead, Congress decided to enlist a 
cadre of private attorneys general.  With knowledge that 
jurisdictions were keen to replace banned voting practices with 
new, more creatively discriminatory practices, Congress included 
the “strong medicine”113 of Section 5, which shifts the burden onto 
covered states and their political subdivisions to prove to the 
federal government that their voting practices and procedure are 
 
111  South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 314 (1966) (internal citations 
omitted). 
112 Id. at 309. 
113 Voting Rights: Hearings on H.R. 6400 Before the Subcomm. No. 5 of the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong. 110–11 (1965) (statement of Rep. Chelf, 
Member, House Comm. on the Judiciary). 
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not discriminatory.  As such, Section 5 “stands alone in American 
history in its alteration of the authority between the federal 
government and the states and the unique procedures it requires of 
states and localities that want to change their laws.”114 
Having endured for over 40 years of judicial interpretation and 
through five congressional reauthorizations, the VRA’s core 
provisions remain largely intact.  Although the Supreme Court has 
tangled over the meaning of the reach of the VRA’s prohibitions, 
Congress has made clear that both Section 2 and Section 5 prohibit 
governmental practices and procedures that have the purpose and 
effect of discriminating on the basis of race.115  The VRA’s definition 
of discrimination, Section 2’s granting of a private right of action, 
and Section 5’s mandate that local jurisdictions must adhere to 
federal standards all combine to provide not only an extraordinary 
response to discrimination in voting in the United States, but also a 
vehicle for the United States to comply with its international 
obligation not to discriminate in voting on the basis of race. 
3.2. The VRA as a Mechanism for Compliance 
The “strong medicine” prescribed by the framers of the VRA 
helps the United States comply with its international obligation not 
to discriminate in voting based on race in ways that would 
otherwise be unattainable.  The VRA largely overcomes the 
roadblocks of federalism understandings, non-self-execution 
declarations, and a refusal to comply with the international 
definition of discrimination. 
 
114 Persily, supra note 16, at 177. 
115 In 1982, Congress amended Section 2 of the VRA to affirm its intention 
that Section 2 allows a plaintiff to sustain her burden of showing discrimination in 
voting if she can show that a “voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or 
standard, practice, or procedure shall [is] imposed or applied . . . in a manner 
which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United 
States to vote on account of race or color.”  Pub. L. No. 97–205, 96 Stat. 131, 134 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2006)) (emphasis added).  Note, however, that 
“calling section 2’s test a ‘results test’ is somewhat of a misnomer because the test 
does not look for mere disproportionality in electoral results.  Rather, plaintiffs 
must establish that under the totality of the circumstances, the challenged 
procedure prevents minorities from effectively participating in the political 
process.”  United States v. Blaine County, 363 F.3d 897, 909 (9th Cir. 2004).  In 
2006, Congress amended Section 5 of the VRA to affirm its intention that changes 
in voting practice or procedure by a jurisdiction covered by Section 5 shall be 
approved only if they “neither has the purpose nor will have the effect of denying or 
abridging the right to vote on account of race or color.”  Pub. L. No. 109–246, §§4–
5, 120 Stat. 577, 580–81 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §1973c (2006)) (emphasis added). 
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First, unlike most other federal civil rights statutes that only 
outlaw intentional discriminatory conduct, both Section 2 and 
Section 5 of the VRA prohibit conduct that has the purpose or effect 
of discriminating on the basis of race.  Thus, the definition of 
discrimination contained under both Section 2 and Section 5 of the 
VRA comports closely with the definitions of discrimination in the 
CERD and ICCPR.  Combined, the ICCPR and CERD require State 
parties not to engage in and to eliminate governmental and private 
conduct that has the purpose or effect of discrimination in voting 
on the basis of race.116  Yet, in assenting to both the ICCPR and 
CERD, the United States issued a proviso limiting its compliance to 
both treaties to the extent that the U.S. Constitution permits.117  The 
Supreme Court has read the Constitution only to prohibit 
governmental conduct that was enacted or administered with a 
discriminatory purpose.118 
The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 
responded to the United States’ most recent CERD report by: 
[R]eiterat[ing] the concern . . . that the definition of racial 
discrimination used in the federal and state legislation and 
in court practice is not always in line with that contained in 
[the CERD], which requires States parties to prohibit and 
eliminate racial discrimination in all its forms, including 
practices and legislation that may not be discriminatory in 
purpose, but in effect.119 
By adhering to a limited definition of discrimination, the United 
States fails to adhere to the full reach of the international 
requirement for nondiscrimination. 
Given the extraordinary mechanism that Congress sought fit to 
employ to attack racial discrimination in voting, the VRA’s 
definition of discriminatory conduct allows the U.S. to facilitate 
compliance with its international obligations.  In 1980, the Supreme 
Court held in Mobile v. Bolden that a violation of Section 2 of the 
 
116 See supra text accompanying notes 49–50 (explaining the salient terms of 
the ICCPR and CERD). 
117 See supra note 72 (noting the limits on the application of the ICCPR and 
CERD). 
118 See supra text accompanying notes 76–86 (detailing the nuances of the 
Supreme Court’s approach to “impermissible discrimination”). 
119 Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, supra note 93, para. 
10. 
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VRA can only be proven by showing that a voting practice or 
procedure was adopted or applied with an intent to discriminate 
on the basis of race.120  In amending the VRA in 1982, Congress 
explicitly responded to Bolden and clarified the language of the 
VRA so that a plaintiff need not show that a voting practice or 
procedure was adopted or maintained with intent to discriminate 
against minority voters.121  Instead, Congress affirmed that a voting 
law or procedure that results in the denial or abridgment of the 
right of any citizen to vote on account of race violates Section 2 of 
the VRA.122  Similarly, Section 5 of the VRA holds that a proposed 
change in voting practice or procedure submitted to the federal 
government can only be approved if it “neither has the purpose 
nor will have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on 
account of race or color.”123  
 Second, Section 5 provides a tool for the federal government to 
enforce its international-like standard of discrimination upon states 
and local jurisdictions in a way unlike any other federal statute and 
in a way that aids the federal government in ensuring that all 
jurisdictions for which it is responsible are in compliance with 
international law.  Both the ICCPR and CERD require that State 
Parties facilitate compliance with international standards at state 
and local levels.124  Yet, the United States’ “federalism 
understanding” attempts to qualify U.S. compliance with both 
treaties by exempting any requirement from compelling states to 
comply with the terms of assented-to treaties.125  The Committee on 
the Elimination of Racial Discrimination responded to the U.S. 
 
120 Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 60 (1980). 
121 Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, 97 Pub. L. No. 205, 96 Stat. 131 
(1982).  See also Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 35 (1986) (construing the Voting 
Rights Act Amendments of 1982 and observing that “[Section 2] was largely a 
response to [the Supreme Court’s] plurality opinion in Mobile v. Bolden . . . which 
had declared that, in order to establish a violation either of § 2 or of the 
Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments, minority voters must prove that a contested 
electoral mechanism was intentionally adopted or maintained by state officials for 
a discriminatory purpose”). 
122 See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 35 (1986) (noting that in passing the Voting Rights 
Act Amendments of 1982, “Congress substantially revised § 2 to make clear that a 
violation could be proved by showing discriminatory effect alone“). 
123 42 U.S.C. 1973c(a) (2006). 
124 See supra text accompanying notes 51–53 (discussing the requirements of 
these treaties). 
125 See supra text accompanying notes 92–100 (detailing how this exemption 
functions). 
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government’s most recent report by noting that each “State party is 
bound to apply the Convention throughout its territory and to 
ensure its effective application at all levels, federal, state, and local, 
regardless of the federal structure of its Government.”126  The 
Committee lamented the lack of a coordinated effort within the 
United States to ensure thorough compliance with the terms of the 
CERD.127 
In Section 5 and, to a lesser extent, Section 2, the federal 
government has tools to coordinate widespread adherence to 
international voting norms.  As noted, Section 5 is unique among 
federal legislation in that it implants the federal government 
directly inside of the lawmaking process of state and local 
governments.  In states and political subdivisions covered by 
Section 5, the federal government—acting through the Department 
of Justice—has authority over local voting practice and procedures.  
In addition, where Section 5 does not apply, the federal 
government can maintain a say over state and local voting 
practices and procedures by bringing suit through Section 2 of the 
VRA.  Although the avenues for proving discrimination in Section 
2 and Section 5 differ, the VRA largely provides the federal 
government with the ability to shape a national voting rights 
policy.128  Coupled with the definition of nondiscrimination of the 
VRA to which states and local governments must adhere, this 
ability to influence state and local voting policy critically helps the 
United States comply with international law. 
 
126 Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination: United States of America, supra note 93, para. 13. 
127 See id. (“The Committee recommends that the State party establish 
appropriate mechanisms to ensure a coordinated approach towards the 
implementation of the Convention at the federal, state and local levels.”). 
128 Unlike Section 5, Section 2 applies nationwide and places the burden on 
the plaintiff (i.e., the voter) to establish a statutory violation.  While a full 
exposition of the differences in governmental conduct prohibited by Section 2 
versus Section 5 is beyond the scope of this Comment, the conduct banned by 
each Section slightly differs.  Thus, a state or local jurisdiction’s violation of 
Section 2 does not necessarily provide grounds for the DOJ to deny preclearance 
under Section 5; and a state or local jurisdiction’s compliance with Section 2 does 
not necessarily guard against a violation of Section 5.  See, e.g., Georgia v. 
Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 477–79 (2003) (denying Georgia’s claim that its redistricting 
plan should have been precleared under § 5 simply because it may have satisfied 
§ 2 of VRA); Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 520 U.S. 471, 477 (1997) (Bossier 
Parish I) (denying the government’s assertion that “a violation of § 2 is an 
independent reason to deny preclearance under § 5”). 
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Third, Section 2 allows individuals to enforce the VRA’s 
definition of discrimination in U.S. Courts, helping litigants 
overcome the United States’ declarations that the CERD and 
ICCPR are non-self-executing.  Section 2 importantly provides 
individuals with access to judicial relief for discriminatory harm.  
While both the ICCPR and CERD bind the United States as a 
matter of international law, the obligations that each treaty confers 
upon the U.S are not enforceable in federal courts, since the United 
States attached an understanding to ratification of both treaties 
stating that neither treaty is self-executing.129  While Section 2 
certainly does not allow individuals to avail themselves of federal 
jurisdiction solely for violations of international nondiscrimination 
norms in the context of voting, it does allow individuals an avenue 
toward relief for the harm that results from practices and 
procedures that would nonetheless probably violate international 
norms.  Moreover, Section 2 provides individuals with relief from 
such discriminatory conduct.  In contrast, governmental conduct 
that violates international norms set out in the ICCPR and CERD 
cannot be met with federal judicial relief. 
3.3. The Uncertainty of Facilitated Compliance 
The continued utility of the VRA as a facilitator of U.S. 
compliance with international voting rights norms is uncertain.  
Future success of the VRA will be tied to the vigor with which the 
Act is enforced and interpreted.  The Civil Rights Division at the 
Department of Justice, which enforces Section 5 of the VRA and 
can enforce Section 2 of the VRA through litigation, was accused of 
under-enforcing the VRA and allowing politics to influence legal 
judgments during the Bush administration.130  For example, in 
2003, political appointees at the Department of Justice overruled a 
recommendation made by career attorneys to reject under Section 5 
a Georgia law that would have required voters to show a photo-
identification when voting.131  A federal district court subsequently 
 
129 See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 736 (2004) (holding that the 
Alien Tort Statute does not create a separate basis of relief for violations of 
international law). 
130 See LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE ON CIVIL RIGHTS EDUCATION FUND, LONG ROAD 
TO JUSTICE: THE CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION AT 50, at 10–11 (2007) (accusing the Civil 
Rights division of letting politics affect its choices under the Bush administration 
and laxly enforcing the Voting Rights Act of 1965). 
131 See Dan Eggen, Staff Opinions Banned in Voting Rights Cases, WASH. POST, 
Dec. 10, 2005, at A3 (discussing the Justice Department barring staff attorneys 
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found a substantial likelihood that the voter-identification law 
violated the Constitution.132  In addition, an internal investigation 
by the Department of Justice recently found that Civil Rights 
Division appointees violated federal law and Department of Justice 
policies by considering the political affiliations of career attorneys 
when making personnel decisions.133 
Under the Obama Administration, Attorney General Eric 
Holder has pledged to depoliticize the Civil Rights Division, 
committing to return the Division “back to doing what it has 
traditionally done” by increasing enforcement of statutes like the 
VRA.134  However, as an Obama Transition Team report noted, 
morale among career attorneys in the Civil Rights Division 
plummeted during the Bush Administration, leading to a 
substantial exodus of career civil rights attorneys who were 
“‘inexperienced or poorly qualified.’”135  The Report predicted the 
Obama Administration would face barriers to effective 
enforcement of civil rights laws, noting that the net effect of the 
politicized hiring process and the brain drain is an attorney work 
force largely ill equipped to handle the complex, big-impact 
litigation that should comprise a significant part of the Division’s 
work.136  Without vigorous enforcement of the VRA, the statute’s 
ability to help the United States comply with international law is 
limited. 
More lasting and significant limitations on the ability of the 
VRA to facilitate U.S. adherence to international voting rights 
 
from offering recommendations in major Voting Rights Act cases, including the 
Georgia photo-identification law).  
132 See Common Cause v. Billips, 406 F. Supp. 2d 1326 (N.D. Ga. 2005) 
(holding that the Georgia photo-identification law likely violates the 
Constitution). 
133 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL & OFFICE OF 
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, AN INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGATIONS OF POLITICIZED 
HIRING AND OTHER IMPROPER PERSONNEL ACTIONS IN THE CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION 65 
(2008), http://www.justice.gov/opr/oig-opr-iaph-crd.pdf (finding that former 
Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights Bradley Schlozman illegally 
considered the political affiliation of attorneys and applicants to the Department 
of Justice when making personnel decisions). 
134 See Charlie Savage, White House to Shift Efforts on Civil Rights, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sep. 1, 2009, at A1, A14 (discussing how the Obama administration is planning a 
major revival of high-impact civil rights enforcement, which had been 
discouraged under the Bush administration). 
135 Id. 
136 Id. 
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standards may yet come from the Supreme Court.  In NAMUDNO, 
eight Justices endorsed an opinion authored by Chief Justice 
Roberts that expressed “serious constitutional questions” over the 
VRA’s requirement in Section 5 that all or part of sixteen States 
seek preclearance from the federal government before 
implementing changes in voting procedure.  The case was brought 
by a small municipal utility district (“MUD”) in Travis County, 
Texas, which had no demonstrated history of racial discrimination 
in voting, but is subject to the VRA’s preclearance requirements 
because it is located within Texas, a covered jurisdiction.  Section 
4(a) of the VRA allows “political subdivisions” of covered 
jurisdictions to bailout from Section 5’s requirements if certain 
statutory requirements—mainly that a jurisdiction has no recent 
history of racial discrimination in voting—are met.137  A separate 
section, defines “political subdivision” as “any county or parish, 
except that where registration for voting is not conducted under 
the supervision of a county or parish, the term shall include any 
other subdivision of a State which conducts a registration for 
voting.”138 
The MUD, which does not register voters and is governed by a 
five-member board chosen through elections administered by 
Travis County, sought “bailout” from Section 5’s preclearance 
requirement and asserted, in the alternative, that Section 5 was 
unconstitutional.139  At its core, the MUD’s “primary argument” 
was that “there [was] no warrant for continuing to presume that 
jurisdictions first identified four decades ago as needing 
extraordinary federal oversight through §5 remain uniformly 
incapable or unwilling to fulfill their obligations to faithfully 
protect the voting rights of all citizens in those parts of the 
country.”140  That is, the MUD argued that the conditions that 
justified Congress in providing the VRA’s extraordinary remedy in 
1965 and in subsequent reauthorizations, no longer existed. 
 
137 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a) (2006).  
138 42 U.S.C. § 1973l(c)(2) (2006). 
139 See Appellant’s Reply Brief at 1–2, Northwest Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. 
One v. Mukasey, No. 08–322 (U.S. Apr. 15, 2009). 
140 Appellant’s Brief Opposing Motions to Affirm at 1, Northwest Austin 
Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Mukasey, No. 08-332 (U.S. Dec. 9, 2008) 
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The Supreme Court held that the definition of “political 
subdivision” in Section 14(c)(2) did not govern bailout eligibility.141  
Instead, according to Chief Justice Roberts’ majority opinion, “all 
political subdivisions—not only those described in § 14(c)(2)—are 
eligible to file a bailout suit.”142  Despite the otherwise clear 
meaning of § 14(c)(2)—i.e., that jurisdictions like the MUD, which 
are not parishes or counties and do not register voters, cannot 
bailout—the Court ruled that the MUD could, in fact, bailout from 
preclearance.  As such, the Court remanded the MUD’s claim for 
determination of whether the MUD, as a “political subdivision,” 
was eligible for bailout and avoided issuing a ruling on the 
constitutional question raised by the MUD.143 
However, in so doing, the Court expressed “serious 
misgivings” that Section 5 “imposes substantial federalism costs” 
by authorizing federal participation into state and local decisions 
related to voting and elections.144  The Chief Justice questioned 
whether “adequate justification to retain the preclearance 
requirements” remained, observing that “[t]hings have changed in 
the [jurisdictions covered by Section 5].  Voter turnout and 
registration rates [for African-American and white voters] 
approach parity.  Blatantly discriminatory evasions of federal 
decrees are rare.  And minority candidates hold office at 
unprecedented levels.”145 
Commentators have interpreted such language—no doubt 
irrelevant to the Court’s actual holding that the MUD was eligible 
to bailout from coverage—as a warning that the Court is prepared 
to invalidate preclearance in a future case.146 
Future rulings that constrain the VRA may further hinder the 
ability of the United States to adhere to its international human 
rights treaty obligations.  A future ruling that modifies or limits 
Congress’s ability to proscribe effects-based discrimination—i.e., 
mandating that Congress can only proscribe what the Constitution 
already prohibits and not what is congruent and proportional to 
the Constitution’s prohibitions—will further remove the United 
 
141 See Northwest. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504, 
2515 (2009). 
142 Id. at 2516. 
143 Id. at 2516–17. 
144 Id. at 2511 (quoting Lopez v. Monterey County, 525 U.S. 266, 282 (1999)). 
145 Id. 
146 See supra text accompanying note 14. 
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States from compliance with the CERD and ICCPR as both treaties 
pertain to the right to vote.  But even a future ruling that leaves the 
effects-based definition of discrimination intact while invalidating 
Section 5 would still gravely harm both the domestic and 
international impact of the VRA.  The Act’s ability to enforce the 
effects-based definition of discrimination at all levels of 
government through preclearance would be hampered.  In turn, 
U.S. implementation of its obligation to enforce the CERD and 
ICCPR at the state and local level would suffer.  Enforcement of the 
VRA’s prohibition on racial discrimination in voting at the state 
and local level would be left entirely to Section 2.  But during the 
last twenty years the Court has routinely interpreted Section 2 
narrowly, and there is no reason to think the Court will not 
continue to limit Section 2.147 
Undoubtedly, there are steps the United States can take that 
would decrease the role that the VRA plays in facilitating U.S. 
compliance with international voting rights standards.  The United 
States can increase its adherence to international voting rights 
standards by reconsidering the RUDs it attached to both the CERD 
and ICCPR and declaring each treaty to be self-executing.  
Congress could enact implementing legislation for each treaty, or 
use its treaty power to bind states to adhere to international 
standards.  Similarly, the executive branch could establish federal 
monitoring and implementation bodies that would ensure U.S. 
compliance with both treaties across the federal government and 
down to state and local governments.148 
Until the United States takes steps to impose international 
standards onto U.S. policies and practices from the outside, the 
VRA must not be forgotten as a vehicle for ushering in compliance 
with international voting rights standards from the inside.  The 
VRA has served as, and can continue to be, a tool for achieving and 
 
147 See, e.g., Bartlett v. Strickland, 129 S. Ct. 1231 (2009) (interpreting Section 2 
of the VRA to require minority groups to constitute a numerical majority of the 
voting-age population in a geographically compact area before proceeding on a 
claim of vote dilution). 
148 For one example of such a proposal, see The Law of the Land: U.S. 
Implementation of Human Rights Treaties Before the Subcommittee on Human Rights 
and the Law of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 6–7 (2009) (statement of 
Wade Henderson, President & CEO, Leadership Conference on Civil and Human 
Rights), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/pdf/12-16-09%20Henderson 
%20Testimony.pdf, wherein Mr. Henderson advocates the expansion of the U.S. 
Commission on Civil Rights’ mandate to include oversight of U.S. adherence to 
international human rights standards). 
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protecting the universal right to vote.  Those interested in 
“bringing human rights home” are right to focus on applying 
international law to the United States from the outside; but they 
must also recognize that which can be lost if the VRA is under-
enforced or interpreted so that it is impotent as a tool for 
implementing a national voting rights policy.  In short, the harm 
that may result from a weakened VRA will impact more than 
domestic policy.  An ineffective or less-effective VRA will also limit 
the ability of the United States to adhere to its international human 
rights obligations. 
4. CONCLUSION 
By assenting to the CERD and ICCPR, the United States 
undertook an obligation to take positive steps to hold itself to an 
international standard of human rights.  The United States bound 
itself to protect and uphold the fundamental human right to 
political participation, regardless of race, color, descent, nationality 
or ethnic origin.  Yet, the U.S. government has also taken steps to 
avoid compliance with the international human rights framework 
to which it assented.  Despite its role in the creation of the modern 
human rights framework, the human rights ideals espoused by the 
United States often conflict with its actual practice. 
This “gap” between ideals and practices exists, in part, because 
the United States has impeded, through the use of RUDs, full 
implementation of its international obligations.  The United States 
has failed to adopt a definition of impermissible racial 
discrimination that encompasses neutral governmental conduct 
that has the effect of discrimination.  The United States has hid 
behind the notion of federalism to abstain from implementation of 
human rights norms.  Finally, the United States has failed to 
provide judicial or other remedies that sanction violators of 
international human rights or compensate victims. 
At least within the sphere of voting rights, the VRA facilitates 
U.S. compliance with the international human rights standards to 
which it has assented.  As an extraordinary remedy to the evils of 
racial discrimination in voting, the VRA goes beyond the floor set 
by the Constitution to employ a definition of discrimination that 
closely tracks the definition of discrimination in the CERD and 
ICCPR.  Moreover, through Section 5 and Section 2, the VRA 
allows the United States to overcome federalism barriers and 
impose a national voting rights standard of nondiscrimination.  
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol31/iss4/5
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And, through Section 2, the VRA allows judicial remedies to 
investigate and punish violators of the VRA while compensating 
victims. 
By no means is the VRA a panacea to the United States’ 
lackluster compliance by the United States with international 
human rights obligations, let alone more limited international 
voting rights obligations.  Indeed, the VRA has proven an inept 
vehicle to remedy at least two of the United States’ more blatant 
violations of international voting rights treaty obligations:  the lack 
of federal representation for residents of the District of Columbia; 
and, the various state laws and policies that disenfranchise 
felons.149 
Furthermore, to the extent that the VRA successfully facilitates 
U.S. compliance with international human rights standards, its 
usefulness as a model that Congress can replicate in other areas of 
international human rights is doubtful.  Congressional power may 
be at its zenith when enforcing nondiscrimination in voting and 
not transferable to the protection of other human rights through 
domestic law.150  In enacting the VRA, Congress acted pursuant to 
at least two sources of Constitutional power:  the Elections 
Clause151 and Congress’s enforcement powers in the Fourteenth 
 
149 Challenges to felony disenfranchisement laws through the VRA have been 
met with mixed results.  Compare Farrakhan v. Gregoire, 590 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 
2010) (holding that Washington State’s felon disfranchisement law is racially 
discriminatory and in violation of the VRA) with Simmons v. Galvin, 575 F.3d 24 
(1st Cir. 2009) (denying relief through Section 2 of the VRA to those challenging 
Massachusetts’ ban on felon voting), Hayden v. Pataki, 449 F.3d 305 (2d Cir. 2006) 
(en banc) (denying relief through Section 2 of the VRA on grounds that Congress 
did not intend felon disenfranchisement laws to fall within the Voting Rights 
Act’s scope) and Johnson v. Bush, 405 F.3d 1214 (11th Cir. 2005) (holding that the 
racist intent with which Florida’s ban on felon voting was originally instituted 
was “cleansed” by Florida’s most recent revision to its Constitution, since that 
revision lacked any racist intent).  The Author is aware of no case in which 
residents of the District of Columbia have challenged the lack of political 
representation in Congress by alleging a violation of the VRA. 
150 See Karlan, supra note 16, at 17 ( “[C]ongressional power is at its apogee 
when Congress acts to protect fundamental rights, to protect suspect or quasi-
suspect classes, to regulate electoral processes that involve the selection of 
members of Congress, to deal with issues relating to politics and political value 
judgments that are relatively unamenable to judicial resolution under the 
Constitution alone, and does so through mechanisms that ‘require the exercise of 
political responsibility’ by the federal government.”).  
151 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (“The Times, Places and Manner of holding 
Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the 
Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such 
Regulations, except as to the Places of choosing Senators.”). 
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and Fifteenth Amendments.152  There are few, if any, other areas in 
which Congress can define discrimination beyond the floor set by 
the Constitution, interfere directly with local lawmaking, and 
provide individuals with the authority to enforce such norms 
through private litigation. 
That the VRA represents such a seismic exertion of 
Congressional power to enforce a human right underscores the 
serious impediments that must be overcome in order to facilitate 
compliance with international human rights norms.  Given that the 
ghost of Senator Bricker lives on in the form of RUDs that 
extinguish congressional enforcement of U.S. international human 
rights obligations through the use of the Treaty Power, the 
protection of civil and human rights remains subject to other grants 
of congressional authority.  In particular, U.S. declarations that the 
CERD and ICCPR are non-self-executing place greater importance 
on congressional authority to protect human rights through the use 
of its Reconstruction Amendments enforcement powers. 
Yet the Supreme Court’s decision in NAMUDNO reveals 
hostility towards Congress’ power under the Reconstruction 
Amendments, perhaps signaling the eventual demise of the VRA 
as a tool for facilitating U.S. adherence to the CERD and ICCPR in 
the area of voting.  Although the Court in NAMUDNO avoided a 
ruling that directly limited the extent to which Congress can 
constitutionally provide a federal remedy for state and local racial 
discrimination in voting, Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion expresses 
serious misgivings about the VRA.  A future Supreme Court ruling 
that restricts the power of Congress to address violations of equal 
protection and fundamental rights will harm U.S. fulfillment of its 
international human rights obligations.  A critical tool for 
“bringing human rights home” will be blunted. 
The VRA has changed the composition of American 
democracy.  The extent to which the VRA can continue to affect 
change and facilitate U.S. adherence to its international voting 
rights obligations remains to be seen. 
 
152 See supra text accompanying notes 88–90 (discussing their application in 
NAMUDNO). 
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